摘要： 大量已有的研究发现，在强监管措施下网络谣言仍层出不穷，后真相时代的信息发布模式导致相关监管机构跛行谣言其后，疲于应对。通过建立传谣网民、普通网民的博弈模型，在双方静态博弈收益矩阵基础上，运用演化博弈理论对网民的行为策略选择进行研究，构建其动态演化博弈模型。发现传谣网民往往“因恶小而为之”，网民参与治理“因善小而不为”，指出传谣与治理模式失配是网络谣言屡禁不绝的治理困境机理。数理分析证明了群体参与网络谣言治理的有效性，提出了一个激励群体参与网络谣言数据治理的简单模型，根据模型的博弈分析，给出了可以促进网民积极参与谣言数据治理合作的措施，本文结论为网络谣言的有效治理提供了新思路。

中图分类号：G206文献标识码：ADOI:10.19358/j.issn.2097-1788.2024.05.010
引用格式：宋彪，闫俊.基于群体参与的网络谣言治理模型研究［J］.网络安全与数据治理，2024，43（5）：69-75，92.

Research on the Internet rumor governance model based on group participation

Abstract： Most of existing studies have found that under strong regulatory measures, online rumors continue to emerge, post-truth mode of information release led to the relevant regulatory agencies unable to keep pace with rumors and tired of dealing with them. Based on the static game profit matrix of both sides, this paper studies the behavior strategy choice of net citizens by using the Evolutionary Game theory, and constructs its dynamic evolution game model. It is pointed out that the mismatch between rumor-making and governance mode is the mechanism of the governance dilemma of Internet rumor. Mathematical analysis proves the effectiveness of group participation in Internet Rumor Governance, and a simple model is proposed to encourage group participation in Internet rumor governance. This paper gives some measures to promote the cooperation of Internet users in rumor governance. This paper provides a new idea for the effective governance of Internet rumors.

Key words : Internet rumor; data governance; Evolutionary Game; government regulation