抗量子密码规模化应用与密码评估适配研究
网络安全与数据治理
张东海1,张晓娜2,李胜男2,贾世杰3,白帆2
1.长安通信科技有限责任公司;2.国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心; 3.中国科学院信息工程研究所
摘要: 基于传统公钥密码的身份认证体系正面临量子计算带来的根本性安全威胁。Shor算法和Grover算法可分别快速破解主流公钥机制和削减对称密码强度。在此背景下,研发并规模化部署抗量子密码技术成为保障未来网络安全的关键举措。然而,我国现行密码评估体系主要面向传统密码算法设计,在指标、方法及判定准则上存在适配缺口,制约了抗量子密码的合规改造与落地。为此,从运行性能、标准合规、评估体系及产业生态等方面分析了抗量子密码的技术现状与面临的挑战,对比了格基、哈希基、多变量基、编码基、同源基等主流抗量子算法路线,并重点探讨其与现行密码评估体系的融合路径,从完善标准、升级测评能力及分阶段迁移等方面提出了合规落地策略,以期为构建量子安全时代的密码保障体系提供参考。
中图分类号:TP309文献标志码:ADOI:10.19358/j.issn.2097-1788.2026.010.003
中文引用格式:张东海,张晓娜,李胜男,等. 抗量子密码规模化应用与密码评估适配研究[J].网络安全与数据治理,2026,45(10):19-28.
英文引用格式:Zhang Donghai,Zhang Xiaona,Li Shengnan, et al. Research on the largescale application of postquantum cryptography and the adaptation of cryptographic evaluation[J].Cyber Security and Data Governance,2026,45(10):19-28.
Research on the large-scale application of post-quantum cryptography and the adaptation of cryptographic evaluation
Zhang Donghai1,Zhang Xiaona2,Li Shengnan2,Jia Shijie3,Bai Fan2
1. Chang′an Communication Technology Co., Ltd.; 2. National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center of China, China; 3. Institute of Information Engineering
Abstract: The identity authentication systems based on traditional public-key cryptography are facing fundamental security threats posed by quantum computing. Shor′s and Grover′s algorithms can rapidly break mainstream public-key mechanisms and reduce the security strength of symmetric cryptography, respectively. In this context, developing and deploying post-quantum cryptography (PQC) at scale has become critical for safeguarding future cybersecurity. However, China′s current cryptographic evaluation framework, primarily designed for classical cryptography, exhibits significant gaps in metrics, methodologies, and assessment criteria when applied to PQC, thereby hindering its compliant transformation and practical implementation. To address this, this paper analyzes the current technical landscape and challenges of PQC from the perspectives of operational performance, standard compliance, evaluation systems, and industrial ecosystem. It compares mainstream PQC algorithmic approaches, including lattice-based, hash-based, multivariatebased, codebased, and isogenybased cryptography. Furthermore, it explores pathways for integrating PQC with the existing cryptographic evaluation framework and proposes compliance strategies, such as refining standards, upgrading assessment capabilities, and implementing phased migration. This work aims to provide a reference for building a cryptographic assurance system in the quantum-safe era.
Key words : post-quantum cryptography (PQC); identity authentication; cryptographic assessment; quantum computing threat
引言
基于公钥密码的身份认证是网络安全信任体系的核心环节,当前广泛部署的RSA、DSA、ECDSA等方案依赖大整数分解、离散对数等数学难题。然而,量子计算正从根本上动摇这一安全基础:Shor算法[1-2]可在多项式时间内破解主流公钥机制,Grover算法[3]则显著降低对称密码的有效安全强度。一旦具备足够逻辑比特的大规模容错量子计算机问世,现有公钥认证与密钥交换协议将面临严重安全风险,特别是长期数据保护与信任链维系等场景。
这种威胁正加速逼近。2026年3月,谷歌量子人工智能团队发布的白皮书指出[4]:通过优化的量子攻击方案,仅需约1 200~1 450个逻辑量子比特,即可在9 min内破解secp256k1椭圆曲线密码体系,并将“量子末日”(QDay)时间窗口提前至2029年前后。若该估算成立,留给密码体系升级的时间窗口将大幅缩短,抗量子密码迁移的紧迫性进一步凸显。
然而,新技术从实验室走向规模化商用离不开合规评估的支撑。商用密码应用安全性评估(简称“密码评估”)是验证密码应用是否正确、合规、有效的技术手段,但我国现行密码评估体系主要针对经典密码算法构建[5],在测评指标、方法及判定准则等方面,针对抗量子密码均存在适配缺口,制约了抗量子密码的合规改造与部署。基于此,本文分析抗量子密码技术现状与多维挑战,重点探讨其与现行密码评估体系的融合路径,以期为构建量子安全时代的密码应用保障体系提供思路。
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作者信息:
张东海1,张晓娜2,李胜男2,贾世杰3,白帆2
(1.长安通信科技有限责任公司,北京102209;
2.国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心,北京100029;
3.中国科学院信息工程研究所,北京100085)